With the advent of state-of-the-art technology, the use of the Internet to access cloud services, online shopping, and social networking sites is progressively becoming an everyday activity among people. When a client visits a particular website for the first time, the website sends a cookie file along with a unique client identifier and stores it in the client’s system. In order to obtain information about the client without requiring the re-entry of the same information, whenever the client next visits the same website, the information of the client can be accessed using the stored cookie.

The website’s cookies operate in such a manner that they can be read by two methods. Firstly, cookies are tied to HTTP requests and are recognized through the use of cookie headers. Secondly, they can be explicitly requested through an Application Programming Interface (API) call by JavaScript and sent to the server [1]. The cookies request-response mechanism amid the web client and server is defined in the Fig. 1.

Conventionally, a cookie consists of numerous attributes, including value, name, path, expiration, and domain. The value attribute is used to store a client’s personal information, such as the user’s session ID, email address, and identification. The other attributes store unique information that can be used to create customized web pages in the user’s browser. This unique information includes products added to the cart or browsing history of a client on a shopping website. Moreover, web cookies are used for the following: (a) cloud services, (b) saved shopping carts, (c) automatic logins, and (d) customized web pages. Furthermore, to evade a hot-linking attack [2]. A session mechanism can also be used with cookies. As the client excessively uses HTTP cookies. Cookies are transmitted across the Internet without any security structure. An adversary can easily access the confidential information stored in the “value” parameter through various cookie-stealing mechanisms.

Microsoft has identified existing security defects in Internet Explorer, where an adversary can steal confidential information from cookies stored in the browser. Likewise, attacks (e.g., Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)) can be launched to send malicious scripts to exploit the client’s web browser. These malicious scripts can access any data in cookies stored by a client’s browser, and this information can be used on the associated website. Additionally, cookies can be altered on some browsers, such as Mozilla Firefox, through malicious websites. It is possible to modify the cookie’s parameters for malicious objectives. For instance, the login session can be extended by modifying the expiration-time parameter. The aforementioned security attacks highlight the problems of both the privacy and integrity of cookies.

Although cookies are widely used by users, their hazardous nature has become a significant concern. Recently, Microsoft has also observed a security deficiency in its Internet Explorer browser, where an adversary can easily steal personal information from stored web cookies. Since the Internet is a public communication channel, stored data can be easily accessed through eavesdropping. Any of the cookie’s parameters can be tampered with for malicious purposes, such as using the session expiration parameter to extend the duration of the login session. The above-mentioned threats to security are caused by either of the following problems:

Cookie Confidentiality: In a cookie, personal information is exposed to eavesdropping whenever it is transmitted in plain text over the Internet. To ensure the privacy of the client, the value of the content, except the server, should not be exposed to anyone.

The superiority of our proposed method is explained through comprehensive benchmarks demonstrating enhanced security and efficiency compared to existing solutions. The need for this method arises from its unique capability to secure HTTP cookies against evolving cybersecurity threats, thereby providing a robust solution where traditional protocols fall short.

In this section, we review the related protocols for cookies. We investigate various cookie protocols, and after analyzing their flaws, we presented an efficient cookie protocol. There are significant limitations are shown in the protocol [3]. Firstly, high-level confidentiality is not offered in their protocol. Second, security against cookie replay attacks are not presented in their protocol. Third, their protocol does not use any procedure for key updating. A cookie protocol is presented by [4] in which a set of inter-dependent cookies are used, e.g., a password cookie, name cookie, life cookie, and a sealed cookie. This protocol does not offer the approach for the confidentiality of cookies.

A survey on web tracking was conducted with cookies by [5]. The information and functionality leaked to adversaries who intercept users’ cookies are scrutinized by [6]. In 2018, a side-channel attack was presented [7] against HTTPS that worked by injecting cookies. These studies illustrate the significance of avoiding injecting attacks and cookie hijacking. Various studies have examined security problems related to cookies [8,9]. Cookie confidentiality is not offered by protocol and cookie integrity is also not provided by the protocols [10,11], and only integrity and confidentiality are discussed in the protocols [12–14].

After scrutinizing the protocols, we noticed a common problem the integrity of cookies is not verified by browsers before users start browsing the Internet. Internet protocol based communication methodologies are yet considered to be the most critical selection for setting up the Internet of Things environment [15–17] and SG’s networks covering buildings, homes, and more prominent neighborhoods also. The selection of Internet protocols based Smart Grid communications that every smart appliance like television sets, dishwashers, heaters, air conditioners, etc., and smart meter have their own IP addresses and help in quality Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) schemes for remote management.

The application of power system security using bidirectional RNN-based network anomalous attack detection in cyber-physical systems. The relevance of our cookies security discussion as it highlights the use of advanced security techniques to protect critical infrastructure. Similarly, our cookies security protocol employs advanced methods to ensure the integrity and security of cookies, which are crucial in maintaining the security of web sessions in internet communications [18].

The studies of [19] highlight the importance of anomaly detection in securing communication systems, which is directly applicable to our cookies security protocol. However, reference [20] emphasizes the necessity of authorizing only legitimate communications, a principle that underpins our approach to ensuring the integrity and security of cookies. By employing advanced methods to detect anomalies and authorize communications, our protocol aims to mitigate potential cyber threats, ensuring a secure browsing experience for users.

However, already developed IP-based communication systems, e.g., the Internet, are distinctly possible problems by controlling information and notable delay-sensitive data, and also a wide range of possible malicious attacks, like denial of service attacks, replay attacks, and traffic analysis. So, Internet Protocol (IP) based Smart Grid communications will also be considered vulnerable to security problems. As a consequence, it is necessary to develop Smart Grid communication protocols properly to control all possible security threats. Additionally, not all entities may be trusted in Smart Grid communication. It is required for Smart Grid communication that the entities participating in communication are authenticated whether they are verified and exact if SG communication is utilizing IP-based protocols [21].

Finally, as a resultant, the SG communication framework would be considered an adequate verification mechanism [22–26] so that malicious client is might not able to compromise the privacy or secrecy [27–31] of the information sharing amid the supplier and client [32,33]. Current technologies in Content Delivery Networks (CDN) [34] and smart meters like Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) lead to secrecy concerns because they rely upon centralizing consumption information of the client at smart meters. According to the Netherlander ruling, they concern about the privacy of mobile computing [35–38], fog computing [39], and smart meters [40].

Chachra et al. [41] discuss how affiliate marketing networks provide a structure that connects independent marketers seeking compensation with merchants looking for customers. This interaction occurs when a client visits a site and the browser sends a request containing a cookie to the affiliate network via a tracking pixel. Should the client then purchase goods, the merchant compensates the affiliate network, which in turn pays the independent marketer. Adversaries exploit this mechanism by inserting their own cookies into clients’ browsers—a tactic known as cookie stuffing. This fraudulent activity diverts revenue intended for legitimate marketers. The paper provides a measurement-based classification of these cookie-filling scams in online marketing, analyzing the types of affiliates and networks targeted, and the specific fraud tactics employed. It also notes that larger networks are more frequently targeted than smaller, merchant-run affiliate programs. The methodology outlined in the paper is designed to meticulously analyze and measure the performance and operational strategies of large affiliate programs such as Rakuten LinkShare, ShareASale, HostGator Affiliate Program, Amazon Associates Program, CJ Affiliate, and ClickBank. Our approach involves a systematic identification process starting with the targeted merchant, moving through the affiliate network, and down to the specific affiliate ID.

The initial step in our methodology is the identification of the cookies and URLs used by affiliates. This is achieved by gathering online information and, where necessary, by registering with the affiliate programs to gain firsthand data. Each Publisher ID is uniquely linked to an Affiliate ID, facilitating a clear and organized tracking system. Further refining our tracking process, we utilize Google Chrome’s extension, Afftracker. This tool enhances our ability to accurately track and associate each Affiliate ID with the domain of the corresponding merchant. By doing so, we can effectively dissect and understand the flow of traffic and the attribution of sales to respective affiliates. This methodical approach not only helps in pinpointing the performance metrics of each affiliate program but also aids in understanding the dynamics between merchants and affiliates, providing a comprehensive overview of affiliate marketing practices across different platforms.

In light of the prevalence of affiliate marketing and the potential risks associated with it, such as cookie stuffing fraud, the above-proposed strategy, based on the Secure Key Exchange Protocol for HTTP Cookies, was carefully examined for its confidentiality and proficiency. By conducting a comparative analysis with existing literature and techniques from relevant investigations, our study sought to address the pressing need for enhanced security measures in cookie management. The results of our investigation revealed that the proposed cookies protocol not only mitigates the risks associated with fraudulent activities such as cookie stuffing but also significantly improves the overall security and effectiveness of cookie handling in web browsing environments. These findings underscore the importance and superiority of our proposed method in comparison to existing approaches, highlighting its potential to provide robust protection against evolving threats in online advertising.

In the current section, we explained the notation table and basics of cryptography, such as hash function, ECC, ECDLP, and CDHP. Furthermore, the adversarial model is described to know the abilities of the A.

This section provides a detailed description of our proposed protocol based on ECC. Where a client sends a pseudo-identity to the server to be registered himself, the server sends a message with parameters for completion of registration. After completion of the registration process, the client sends a login request message. Receiving a request message, a server transmits parameters with a challenge request message, and after that, when all authentication gets completed, the session key is shared to start the services between server and client. An operational procedure and comparison with other related protocols are also provided.

The proposed protocol consists of three major phases as described in below subsections. Primarily, we used both random numbers and time stamps for protection against several attacks. The notations are listed in Table 1 and description and analysis of the proposed protocol are presented in Proposed Protocol.

A detailed description of the above phases is given as follows.

In Section 5, we provide a quick overview of both formal and informal security evaluations. These introductory remarks lay the groundwork for the full examination of the security characteristics and effectiveness of our suggested protocol in the following subsections.

In this section, we state the performance of the proposed protocol. The explanation and implementation of the proposed and related protocols are given below:

Cryptographic-operations (TSM,TOWH,TAE,TPA,TPM,TSE,TSD,THMAC,TAD,T⊕,Ts||) are implemented in Ubunto utilizing PyCrypto library, with an 8.0 GB RAM and 2.60 GHZ processor with core i7 using Python programming-language. This verification protocol executed 10 times with the same suppositions by average time. Operations (T⊕) and (Ts||) take less execution time. So, these operations are not included in the computations of total time. The operation TOWH(.) takes 0.00070 ms for execution while T_pm takes 0.0020 ms for point multiplication. The running time of cryptographic operations is described in Table 2.

Moreover, Tables 3 and 4 present computational, storage, and communication costs of the proposed protocol in contrast to relevant protocols [44–48] as follows.

Our conclusion has been enhanced to better summarize the key findings, including the identification of various issues such as cost, privacy, and security challenges in cookie management and online transactions. We introduced an ECC-based lightweight, secure, and efficient key agreement authentication protocol designed to tackle these problems through secure cryptographic operations. Our free study evaluating the security of this protocol and a detailed comparative analysis of computation, communication, and storage costs demonstrate its superior efficiency and security over existing protocols. Additionally, we acknowledge the limitations of our research, particularly in the scalability of the protocol across diverse environments, and recommend future studies to explore this area further.

In the future, we will focus on improving cookie security in affiliate marketing to offer strong protection against unwanted tracking and data breaches. We want to create standards that protect user data while ensuring transparency and compliance in affiliate networks.