NDN is a new data-centric architecture that defines three different roles, such as Routers, Clients/Customer, and Providers with two types of packets (i.e., Interest Packet and Data Packet). Moreover, each router maintains three kinds of data structures, such as Pending Interest Table (PIT), Forwarding Information Base (FIB), and Content Store (CS) [33]. The data attainment process begins by sending an Interest with a particular name from the client’s side. The routers rely on FIBs for transferring the interest to a potential provider and generate a PIT entry list on each router to establish an opposite path. Based on the opposite path, the provider of any interest returns the data to the client with the target data. The CS then stores the targeted data that pass through it for future use [34].

Suppose Client A begins the data attainment process by sending an Interest with a particular name, as shown in Fig. 1. Initially, the Interest of Client A will be transferred using the services of FIB to the potential provider of the content/data. The feedback to that particular interest will be stored inside the CS of Router 4, Router 3, and Router 1 for future reuse. Later on, if another Client B needs the same content/data, then the interest will be satisfied locally from the CS of Router 3, instead of transferring the Interest of Client B to the original provider of the content/data [35].

Inspired by the above-mentioned discussion, we propose an IBS scheme for IoTEH in NDN networks. The proposed scheme is based on the concept of HCC, which provides the same level of security in contrast with ECC, RSA, and BRPG using small key sizes. The key research finding is mentioned below:

We proposed a secure NDN framework for Internet of Things Enabled Healthcare (IoTEH) using Identity-Based Signacryption (IBS) cryptography.

In Section 2, we discuss the related work about NDN based healthcare and IBS schemes. Section 3 comprises the preliminaries, threat model, and syntax of the proposed scheme. Section 4 includes the proposed network model and the proposed algorithm. Section 5 describes the security analysis for the proposed scheme. Section 6 includes a comparative analysis. In Section 7, we deployed our scheme on IoTBH in NDN networks, and Section 8 concludes our research.

In 2015, Saxena et al. [10] proposed an NDN based solution for healthcare. The proposed scheme can locate a network-based healthcare service. Later in 2017, Saxena et al. [11] tossed another NDN based scheme for emergency healthcare services. The author’s aims to verify the authenticity of emergency messages in NDN based healthcare. However, in both the schemes [10,11], the authors did not provide a concrete security plan for the proposed scheme.

Recently, Wang et al. [12] proposed a monitoring framework to secure NDN-based healthcare infrastructure using the services of edge cloud. The authors, for the first time, introduce a security framework for NDN-based healthcare. In the given framework, the author exploits the advantages of NDN to enhance the efficiency of medical data. Unfortunately, the author used heavy attribute-based encryption using bilinear pairing.

Signcryption and IBC [36] is an exciting research topic to develop a secure and effective IBS scheme. In 2002, Malone-Lee [23] provided the first IBS scheme using BRPG. Later in 2006, Duan et al. [37], proposed a multi-receiver IBS scheme for multiple receivers. However, the given scheme is subject to massive pairing operation due to BRPG. In 2008, Li et al. [38] coined an identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme for application to transmit a message securely and authentically. However, the given scheme is subject to massive pairing operation due to BRPG.

Later in 2013, Libert et al. [39] showed that the scheme of Malone-Lee’s did not provide the semantic security because the signature of the signed message appears in the ultimate ciphertext. The authors also proposed three new IBS schemes, but they did not provide the essential security properties of public verifiability and forward secrecy. Similarly, the concept of IBS was further expanded to cater to further applications. In 2017, Nayak [40] constructed a new IBS scheme based on ECC. Unlike the previous schemes, the given approach reduces the computational and communicational resources. Besides, the given scheme provides the security assets of authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and unforgeability. However, there is still a need for improvement in the communication and computation cost because the cost of the scalar point multiplication on the elliptic curve is still not affordable for the resource-constrained environment. Later, in the same year, Reddi et al. [41] presented an IBS that is used to authenticate and verify both parties involved in the communication. In the proposed work, the author incorporated the idea of IBS into the Key Agreement Protocol. However, the given scheme is subject to massive pairing operation due to BRPG. Later, in 2017, Karati et al. [42] proposed an IBS scheme for the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).

Conversely, the proposed scheme suffers from a massive pairing operation due to the use of BRPG. Later in 2017, Swapna et al. [43] presented an IBS scheme to secure the communication between end-users and smart homes. The given scheme can provide the security assets of integrity, authentication, and confidentiality to protect the communication between end-users and smart homes from different types of possible security attacks. Unfortunately, the given scheme was constructed on bilinear pairing.

In 2020, Dharminder et al. [44] presented an IBS scheme for IIoT crowdsourcing under the standard model. In the proposed framework, the user adds a pairing free computation signing, making it efficient for the user. According to the authors, the proposed scheme is efficient in terms of computational and communicational costs. However, the given scheme suffers from high bandwidth usage and heavy computation costs due to the utilization of BRPG.

For conducting the security analysis, we performed the following complexity assumptions:

The f𝔮 is a finite field with the order 𝔮, where (𝔮)≈2160.

In our scheme, we examine and consider the Doley–Yao [45,46] threat model. According to Doley–Yao, communication between two or more entities are not trusted and secure, as attackers have full command to expose the contents of the ciphertext and inject false encryption/signature text into the network. As NDN-based healthcare is posed to various types of security threats, this means that the user’s sensitive information can be easily forged or delete by any adversaries. To maintain the security and authentication of IoTEH in NDN networks, authentication and secure communication between entities are required.

The syntax of our newly proposed scheme consists of the following phases:

Setup Phase: In this phase, the Private Key Generation (PKG) produces its master secret key (ν) and computes the master public key (λ) and the security parameter set ρ.

In Fig. 2, we have shown the secure network modal for IoTEH in NDN networks. The proposed modal consists of the participants, such as consumer, producer, NDN routers, and PKG. The role of each participant is explained below:

Role of Consumer: The consumer can be a hospital, patient, doctor, or any IoT device (smartphone, smartwatch, sensor, etc.) that want secure healthcare-related information like (patient records, patient stats, online patient monitoring).

In our proposed scheme, before starting a secure communication, the consumer and producer send their identities to PKG. After receiving the identities of both the consumer and producer, the PKG generates the private and public keys for both of them and delivers it using a secure connection.

Suppose a consumer sends an interest for healthcare-related information, the NDN routers will transfer that interest to the producer. The producer will signcrypt the information based on the interest of the consumer. The signcrypted information is then forwarded to the consumer through the NDN routers. The NDN router, after receiving the information from the producer, it will forward the information using the services of FIB by assigning a PIT interface without caching. The process of forwarding without caching will continue until the information is reached to the original consumer. Obviously, the caching of this information will not facilitate any consumer later because the information can only be designcrypted using the private key of the requested consumer.

The proposed algorithm consists of the following 4 phases, such as setup phase, key extraction phase, signcryption phase and unsigncryption phase [40].

The notation used in our algorithms is mentioned in Tab. 1.

Setup:

This algorithm is running by the PKG.

Key Extraction:

This algorithm is executed by the PKG that takes the identities of users (IDu) and compute the public and private keys for the users using the IDu as:

Compute provider private key (ϱp): ϱp=ν⋅𝒽0(IDp)mod𝓃.

After that, it sends the public and private key (ϱu,ςu) by using a secure network.

Signcryption:

This algorithm is run by the producer. It takes the message (m), fresh nonce (Λ), IDc, IDp, D, ϱp, ςc as input and then perform the following computations.

Send the signcrypted text 𝓈=(𝔴,Z,∇,𝒷) to the consumer.

Unsigncryption:

This algorithm is run on the consumer side. It takes 𝓈=(𝔴,Z,∇,𝒷), ϱ𝒸, ςp.

𝔍=∇⋅ςc+IDp⋅Z⋅𝒷⋅ςp⋅ϱ𝒸=(IDc⋅𝓇-IDp⋅Z⋅ϱp⋅𝒷)⋅ςc+IDp⋅Z⋅𝒷⋅ςp⋅ϱ𝒸=IDc⋅𝓇⋅ςc-IDp⋅Z⋅ϱp⋅𝒷⋅ςc+IDp⋅Z⋅𝒷⋅ςp⋅ϱ𝒸=IDc⋅𝓇⋅ςc-IDp⋅Z⋅ϱp⋅𝒷.ςc+IDp⋅Z⋅𝒷⋅ϱp⋅Dϱc=IDc⋅𝓇⋅ςc-IDp⋅Z⋅ϱp⋅𝒷⋅ςc+IDp⋅Z⋅𝒷⋅ϱp⋅ςc=IDc⋅𝓇⋅ςc=𝔍

An IBS scheme is supposed to succeed in the property of confidentiality if no adversary can compromise the encryption key of the sender.

Proof: The proposed plan ensures the property of confidentiality. If an intruder wants to steal the original content or secret key of the message, he/she must have information about the key in advance as 𝔍=IDc⋅𝓇⋅ςc. To determine 𝔍, the intruder needs to compute 𝓇 from 𝒷=𝓇⋅D, which infeasible due to the properties of HDLP.

An IBS is considered to achieve the security asset of authentication if the consumer can verify the source of the message.

Proof: The consumer can use his public key ςc and signature ∇ to verify the authenticity of the producer. As the message is signed with the private key ϱp of the producer. In our scheme, the consumer can authenticate the identity of the producer.

An IBS scheme is likely to achieve the security asset of integrity if no adversary can generate the same hash value for two different sizes/nature messages.

Proof: The provider takes the “hash value” “Z=𝒽1(m||Λ||IDp||IDc||ςc)” of the message before sending the message. If the attacker changes the ciphertext of the message, then the consumer can perform the following operation for verification of the ciphertext. The consumer take m′=d𝔍(𝔴) and compute the Z′=𝒽1(m||Λ||IDp||IDc||ςc). After that, the consumer compares the Z=Z′ if they are equal, then the integrity of the message holds; otherwise, the message has been altered.

An IBS scheme is considered to achieve the security assets of unforgeability if there exists no intruder which can compromise the private key of the producer.

Proof: In our scheme, if an intruder tries to generate a valid signature, he/she must need to calculate ∇ from (IDc⋅𝓇-IDp⋅Z⋅ϱp⋅𝒷) and to do so, the attacker needs to find 𝓇 from the 𝒷=𝓇⋅D. Further, the attacker also needs to find ϱp from ςp=ϱp⋅D. So, it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to solve a two-time HDLP.

An IBS scheme is supposed to succeed in the security service of non-repudiation if a sender cannot repudiate his signcrypted text.

Proof: As the message is signed with the private key ϱp of the producer. In our scheme, the consumer can authenticate the provider identity IDp. So, the provider later can’t deny from his signature.